Nike 面臨競爭對手採取快時尚的策略步步進逼，壓力愈來愈大，2010 年開始季度營收成長放緩，Nike 公佈最新財報，上季營收 90.7 億美元，成長創近 7 年新低，毛利率 43.7%，下滑 1.8%，庫存上升 6%，預期北美市況可能進一步萎縮。不過網路商店以及零售點的營業額帶來曙光，網路商店營收季增 19%，零售點同店銷售額成長 5%。彭博 (Bloomberg) 報導，Nike 現階段要做的是讓購物變成更加個人化的體驗。
同一品牌產品依照價位做區隔是很常見的事，譬如 Nike 只讓精品旗艦店賣最貴的限定鞋款，而把賣不掉的喬丹鞋送到連鎖鞋店賣場，低價產品或是過季鞋送到連鎖折扣大賣場，瞄準不同客戶。其實蘋果推出高價的 iPhone X 也是一樣，在產品普及化且競爭壓力仍大的時後，創造高不可攀的產品是逼出市場隱形版圖的重要策略。
彭博認為，Nike 的真正才能不是行銷，而是他們徹底了解出貨策略。Nike 中階經理人透過一張超大的表格，控管什麼樣的產品該出貨到哪裡，譬如確保某款滑板鞋要讓消費者不容易找到，為中國市場訂製特殊設計款，把暢銷鞋款分銷到所有迪克體育用品，把 Chuck Taylors 鞋款送到折扣賣場。
但現在他們的出貨策略要全部收回，打破製造商與零售商多年來的合作模式，Nike 把市場熱捧的鞋款透過自己的生態系統販售，包括應用程式 SNKRS，自家網路商店以及自家零售店。較低價，不那麼熱賣的鞋款則下放到折自己經營的折扣商店以及亞馬遜，Nike 在紐約還經營一小時內現場定制的鞋店。
Nike 所有的策略佈局，目的是更精準的鎖定目標族群，並且要能夠領先消費者，提供消費者個人化與數位化的體驗。而從自家零售店、網路生態系統收集到的資訊，可進一步讓 Nike 更清楚消費者在產品與價格上的偏好。追求更快的市場反應速度之外，直接銷售的利潤也比透過中間商更高。
Nike 上季銷售額中來自直接銷售而非批發的比重季增 11%，Nike 直接銷售佔總營收比重已從 2012 年的 4% 增加到 28%，Under Armour 為 31%，愛迪達為 23%。
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Nike Cuts Out the Middleman to Sell You the Perfect SneakerNike started cleaning up its stats sheet Tuesday. For the first time, the sneaker empire declined to report “future orders,” a critical measure of wholesale demand from the galaxy of retailers who sell the famous kicks. The Swoosh says the metric doesn’t matter much anymore, because now it’s focused on doing business directly with consumers and cutting out the middleman.
While Nike reported its slowest quarterly sales growth since 2010, its performance as a retailer—rather than a wholesaler—was a relative highlight. Sales on Nike’s own web store were up 19 percent in the recent quarter, while its retail locations notched a 5 percent gain in same-store sales. Chief Executive Officer Mark Parker said the company is obsessed right now with making shopping more personal. “Retailers who don’t embrace distinction will be left behind,” he warned on a conference call Tuesday.
Still, that wasn’t enough to impress investors—at least, not yet.
The overlooked beauty of brick-and-mortar retail is how well retail chains lend themselves to what economists call price segmentation. Shoemakers such as Nike can easily target customers by sending the right shoes to the right kind of store (think: first-class vs. coach, iPhone X vs. iPhone 8, Banana Republic vs. Old Navy). In Nike’s case, it ships expensive, limited edition sneakers to high-end boutiques, routes its stock Jordans to chains like Foot Locker Retail Inc., and dumps its low-end product and off-key colorways in such places as DSW Inc.
If done correctly, all this socioeconomic slotting moves as much merchandise as possible with minimal fuss, while not tarnishing the larger brand. And make no mistake: Nike does it correctly. On its face, the Swoosh is a design shop supercharged by the kind of storytelling its TV commercials, billboards and magazine ads are famous for. But Nike’s real genius isn’t marketing, it’s merchandising: knowing exactly what to ship where. For every sneaker sketching savant in Beaverton, Oregon, there’s a mid-level manager with a giant spreadsheet, making sure “Momofuku” Dunks aren’t too easy to find, ordering up a special design for China, distributing its best-sellers to all the right Dick’s Sporting Goods Inc. outlets and dumping plenty of Chuck Taylors at outlet malls.
Mark Parker, Nike’s chief executive officer. Photographer: Natalie Behring/Bloomberg
Nike is now upsetting its own well-oiled applecart. In giving traditional retail the stiff arm, which Nike made official in June, the Oregon empire is tearing up that playbook and trying to make an end run around the basic economics of price segmentation. The strategy—a bold move, given the historical manufacturer-to-retail model being discarded—requires no shortage of swagger. But Nike’s numbers show that the bet appears to be working, primarily because Nike has been sharpening its digital game.
Sought-after sneakers now ship out via Nike’s own ecosystem of apps, including SNKRS, which it launched early last year. The heart of its lineup, meanwhile, sells on Nike.com and in its own big box stores. As for the cheaper, less-popular kicks, they quietly trickle into the company’s “factory” stores (read: outlet) and onto Amazon.com. Nike even has a studio in New York that makes customized shoes on-site in about an hour.
In short, the company is deemphasizing its ready made network of retailers to create an even more precise targeting mechanism.
Yesterday, Parker said the end goal is to get ahead of the consumer and offer “the most personal, digitally connected experiences” in the industry. “While changing your approach is never easy, Nike has proven before that when we do, it’s always ignited the next phase of growth for our company,” he explained.
In theory, Nike can know any given customer better—and his or her willingness to pay—by using its own venues and platforms, particularly on its digital properties. The challenge will be building the mechanism to sort all the data, and in doing so, the customers. In the real world, they sort themselves: The high-end boutique isn’t right next to the cut-rate discount outlet. In the virtual world, it’s not so easy.
For the record, Under Armour Inc. is slightly ahead of Nike Inc., with 31 percent of its sales coming directly from consumers; Adidas AG is slightly behind, with 23 percent of revenue from retail. At its current pace, Nike will soon be collecting one in three of its sales dollars directly from consumers. Its challenge will be making sure that none of them get too good a deal.
Original Article: Bloomberg